This paper quantifies the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth in Asia for . Our panel estimations show that transnational terrorist attacks had a significant growth-limiting effect. An additional terrorist incident per million persons reduces GDP per capita growth by about 1.5 percent. In populous countries, many additional attacks are needed to achieve such a large impact. Transnational terrorism reduces growth by crowding in government expenditures. Unlike developing countries, developed countries are able to absorb terrorism without displaying adverse economic consequences. An internal conflict has the greatest growth concern, more than twice that of transnational terrorism. Conflict variables are associated with smaller investment shares and increased government spending, with the crowding-in of government spending being the dominant influence.
conflicts raise the costs of doing business. Nearby conflicts can reduce economic growth by disrupting supply lines, creating refugee inflows, causing border skirmishes, and increasing security spending. Murdoch and Sandler (2004) showed that each war in a neighboring state reduces annual growth rates by about 0.5% per year. Thus, a war not only limits growth at home, but also reduces growth within 800 kilometers of each conflict country's borders as nearby countries divert resources to defense to ward off the spread of conflict (Murdoch and Sandler, 2004) .
The current study has six purposes. First, and foremost, we present panel estimates for a sample of 42 Asian countries to quantify the impact of terrorism and conflicts on income per capita growth for . Panel estimation methods control for country-specific and timespecific unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we distinguish the influence of terrorism on economic growth from that of internal and external conflicts. Third, these influences are investigated for cohorts of developed and developing countries to ascertain whether development can better allow a country to absorb the impact of political violence. Fourth, econometric estimations relate violence-induced growth reductions to two pathways -reduced investment and increased government expenditures. Fifth, a host of diagnostic and sensitivity tests support our empirical specification. Last, we draw some policy conclusions.
Earlier studies on the economic consequences of terrorism growth either focused on the world (Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides, 2004; Tavares, 2004) or on Europe (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008) . There are compelling grounds for focusing on Asia. Such a study allows us to ascertain whether Asian economies respond differently than the rest of the world or Europe to terrorism. Since 1970, Asia has had more conflicts than any other region (Gleditsch et al., 2002) .
With the rise of fundamentalist terrorism in the 1980s, there are many transnational terrorist attacks in Asia, which is home to some of the world's most notorious terrorist groups -e.g., al-Qaida, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and others. The incidence of Asian terrorist attacks has risen following 9/11 as Western democracies augmented homeland security (Enders and Sandler, 2006b ). For a much smaller Asian sample and a different time period, Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) did not uncover any significant effect of terrorism on economic growth. Our larger sample and expanded runs permit us to take a more careful look at this crucial region and to distinguish the growth consequences of terrorism between developing and developed countries. Asia houses a sizable share of the world's population and contains many of today's fastest growing economies. Thus, the impact of terrorism on these economies deserves study.
For the entire Asian sample, transnational terrorism and internal conflict have significant adverse consequences for growth, with the largest impact coming from internal conflicts.
Developing Asian countries are much more affected by political violence than their more developed counterpart, suggesting that development cushions greatly the impact of terrorism and conflicts. Not surprising, political violence adversely affects investment, while it increases government spending. Transnational terrorism and conflicts have a particularly strong influence in augmenting government spending, with internal and external conflicts displaying the stronger impact.
The remainder of the paper contains four main sections. Section 2 presents background including definitions, the primary influences on income per capita growth, and a brief review of the literature. Section 3 includes the empirical specification and data. Estimations and results then follow in section 4. Concluding remarks and policy implications are presented in section 5.
DEFINITIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND PAST LITERATURE
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. Terrorists try to circumvent the democratic process by extorting concessions through the pressures that a targeted citizenry may bring on its government to end the violence. The above definition excludes state terror, where the state applies violence to intimidate its citizens (e.g., Stalin in the Soviet Union), but includes state-sponsored terrorism where a state assists (e.g., through safe havens, intelligence, or funding) a terrorist group.
Terrorists employ myriad modes of attack -e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and skyjackings -whose mix is chosen optimally to trade off risks and returns (Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley, 1983) . Terrorists try to make their attacks appear to be random to maximize an audience's anxiety as risks seem ubiquitous. In truth, attacks are not random but planned to exploit perceived target weaknesses and value.
Terrorist events are usually subdivided into two varieties: domestic and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is homegrown with consequences for only the host country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. As such, domestic terrorism involves perpetrators, victims, and targets solely from the host country. Through its victims, targets, supporters, perpetrators, or implications, transnational terrorism concerns more than a single country. If the terrorists cross a border to perpetrate their acts, then the attacks are transnational. Terrorist incidents that begin in one country and conclude in another country (e.g., an international skyjacking or the mailing of a letter bomb to another country) are transnational terrorist events.
The kidnapping (and subsequent murder) in 2002 of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel global. The bombing of foreign-owned investments for political reasons is a transnational terrorist incident, in which FDI may be persuaded over time to seek a safer country. For the period of this study , both domestic and transnational terrorism plagued Asian countries. However, since we could not find a dataset with a reliable measure of domestic incidents for an extended time period, we only relate transnational terrorist attacks to economic growth.
1
Internal conflicts include intrastate wars, where all violence is confined within the country's borders. Such conflicts typically concern opposition groups fighting for territory or political rights. At times, internal conflict may also be between ethnic groups with opposing interests. We use UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2007 (Gleditsch et al., 2002 and hence apply their definitions. Conflict is "internal" when it involves the home government and domestic opposition groups; conflict is "internationalized internal" when it involves the home government, domestic opposition groups, and other countries. The latter may provide support to one of the adversaries or else dispatch some troops to the conflict. As is common in the literature, we include internal and internationalized internal conflicts as internal conflicts. In contrast, external conflict may be between two or more countries (i.e., interstate) or "extrastate" between a country and a non-state group from abroad (Gleditsch et al., 2002) . The Armed Conflict Dataset distinguishes between minor conflicts with 25 to 999 battle-related deaths per year and wars with 1000 or more battle-related deaths per year. Because we use internal conflicts as a proxy for domestic terrorism for some of the runs in section 4, we include all conflicts in our two conflict categories with 25 or more battle-related deaths. Terrorism is a tactic that is used in both internal and external wars -e.g., the Vietnam War involving the United
States had a lot of terrorist attacks. In small civil wars, some violence may be in the form of terrorist attacks owing to the modest means of an opposition group -e.g., Tamil Tiger suicide attacks in Sri Lanka.
[ Figure 1 near here]
In Figure 1 , the number of Asian countries embroiled in internal and external conflicts is displayed for each year during the sample period. Since 1974, there have been more Asian countries involved in internal than in external conflicts. After 1988, there has been typically a single external war involving Pakistan and India over a territorial dispute in Kashmir. This war has also resulted in terrorist attacks in both countries. There have been eight or more Asian countries suffering internal conflicts from 1977 on.
We now turn to three important determinants of income per capita growth (growth). The initial level of income per capita (y) is a positive influence on economic growth owing to the notion of convergence, whereby the income per capita of a poorer country outpaces that of a richer country (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) . Convergence hinges on diminishing returns, in which countries are better able to add to output when there is less initial output and inputs. Convergence assumes that comparison countries possess identical production functions and transition equations, but differ in their initial income per capita. The latter assumption may hold for many Asian countries at similar stages of development that confront analogous production conditions. The investment share ( ) Equations (1)- (3) examine the determinants of the income per capita growth rate, the investment share, and the government spending share (G/GDP), respectively, where i = 1, …, N represents the country and t = 1, …, T indexes the time period. The independent variable terror is a measure of transnational terrorist attacks, internal denotes internal conflicts, external measures external conflicts, and polity quantifies the degree of democracy. βs, γs, and ϕs are regression coefficients, while the remaining Greek letters indicate the disturbances. In equations (1)- (3), each disturbance consists of three components: unobservable (time-invariant) country effect, subscripted with i; unobservable time effect, subscripted with t; and the classical random error.
For example, i α is the unobservable country-specific effect, t λ is the unobservable time-specific effect, and it ν is the stochastic error term. In equation (1), political violence variables are added to the main determinants of economic growth. Equations (2)- (3) identify the potential channels through which the political violence variables slow down economic growth by either reducing investments or augmenting government spending through security expenditures.
Our empirical approach is based on the behavior of the unobservable effects (see e.g., Baltagi, 2005) . We perform F-test to examine the presence of unobservable effects.
3 If the effects are not present, we apply ordinary least squares (OLS), which is consistent and efficient.
If, however, unobservable effects are present, we employ the one-way fixed-effects estimator when there are only country effects (time effects), and the two-way fixed-effects estimator when evidence suggests both time and country effects. In choosing the fixed-effects method, we assume that the unobservable effects are fixed parameters for estimation. Alternatively, we can regard the effects as random and apply generalized least squares (GLS), which implies that the unobservable effects are part of the disturbance and therefore independent of the observable explanatory variables. We implement the Hausman test to investigate the correlation between the effects and the regressors. If the Hausman test supports independence between the observable regressors and the unobservable effects, we use the random-effects estimator, in addition to the fixed-effects model, for sensitivity analysis.
Data
Our data are drawn from four sources: Penn World (Gleditsch et al., 2002) , and Polity IV Dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004) . We construct an unbalanced dataset for 42 Asian countries for 1970-2004. 4 The sample countries include Asian countries for which we can get both macroeconomic and political violence data and, as such, include the main developing and developed countries within the region. We begin at 1970 to increase the number of countries with macroeconomic data. Moreover, terrorism data for 1968-1969 is rather spotty because terrorism datasets were only started in 1968. By 1970, these datasets were better able to track incidents.
Macroeconomic variables -real GDP per capita in constant dollars, economic openness (exports plus imports as a share of real GDP), investment share of real GDP, population, and government expenditure share of real GDP -are obtained from the Penn World Table Version 6.2. Based on data on real GDP per capita, we compute the growth of real GDP per capita as the difference in the log (ln) of GDP per capita of subsequent years. We also calculate the log of the index of country i's openness at time t, which we denote by ( )
ITERATE is used to construct the number of transnational terrorist incidents per million persons (terror), which indicates the level of transnational terrorist incidents normalized by the venue country's population. Five incidents in a year in a country with a population of 300 million should, ceteris paribus, have less of an economic influence than the same number of incidents in a country with a tenth of the population. We generally favor a terrorism measure where the number of events is used rather than a dummy that merely signals one or more events in a given year, since the latter does not indicate the prevalence of terrorism. We have two indicator variables for conflicts. Based on UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, external is 1 if the country experienced an international conflict (interstate or extrastate) in a given year and is 0 otherwise; similarly internal is 1 if the country experienced an internal conflict (internal or internationalized internal) in a given year and is 0 otherwise. Finally, we obtain the polity variable from the Polity IV Dataset for each sample country and year. This polity measure reflects three interdependent elements -the amount of political participation, restraints (if any) on executive power, and the extent of government-backed civil liberties (e.g., freedom of association, freedom of speech, protection against unwarranted search and seizure, and due process under the law). These three elements are aggregated into a single score that varies from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
Summary statistics are displayed for our variables in Table 1 of polity is around +1, with a standard deviation of 7; hence, the extent of democracy varies highly across our sample countries.
[ We perform some cleanup of ITERATE data because it lists both a start and an end country for an incident. Typically, the start and end country locations are the same, but they differ for a small percentage of incidents. Our concern is when the start or end country lies outside of Asia -our region of interest. For 90 events, the incident started in an Asian country but ended outside of Asia. After reading the description of these 90 events, we determine that 16 of these incidents really took place in the Asian country of origin (e.g., a plane hijacked at an Asian airport). The other 74 events really took place outside of Asia and are dropped. There
were 16 terrorist events that ended within Asia but started outside of the region (e.g., letter bombs mailed from Europe to an Asian country). Eight of these observations are kept after further investigation. Finally, 47 incidents started in one Asian location (e.g., India) and concluded in another Asian location (e.g., Pakistan). After consulting the incidents' descriptions, 43 of them are assigned to the start country and the remaining 4 are assigned to the end location.
Also, we do not include "terrorist events" coded as arms smuggling (incident type 22), since the use of these arms in a specific terrorist incident is not indicated. Moreover, the arms may be intended for purposes other than terrorism -e.g., war or crime. 
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
We first estimate the growth equation in equation (1) for our entire Asian sample. The Hausman test between two-way fixed-effects and two-way random-effects specifications rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between the explanatory variables and the unobserved effects;
hence, the standard random-effects estimation is not appropriate. We also perform F-tests for the presence of country-specific and time-specific effects and find the presence of both effects, thereby supporting our two-way fixed-effects estimations.
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In Table 2 , Models 1-3 sequentially introduce the three conflict variables -transnational terrorist events, external conflicts, and internal conflicts -one at a time to three standard growth explanatory variables that appear in all five models. Model 4 includes conflict variables together with transnational terrorism, and Model 5 adds the democracy variable. Consistent with the growth literature, the log of lagged GDP per capita has a negative influence on income per capita growth, which reflects convergence. 6 The lagged investment share has the anticipated positive effect on income per capita growth. Across all five models, the impacts of these two variables are robust. The log of lagged openness is not a positive determinant of growth, which agrees with Rodrik's (1999) view that the influence of openness on growth is overstated, especially for developing countries which comprise most of our sample. Openness has a negative sign across all models but is statistically significant only in Model 5, when the polity variable is included;
but one should be cautious in attributing this change to the inclusion of this variable. Polity IV Dataset does not have regime information for nine countries of our sample (i.e., Brunel, Hong Kong, Kiribati, Maldives, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu) and therefore the discrepancies may exist because the samples differ (Model 5 has over 300 fewer observations).
To investigate, we reestimate Model 5 without the polity variable, excluding these nine countries, so that there are 886 observations. The results are almost identical to those presented in Table 2 with the polity variable included, which suggests that the differences are coming from the sample size. The impact of democracy on growth is not statistically significant.
[ Table 2 near here]
For the political violence variables, transnational terrorism and internal conflicts have the expected negative impact on growth; however, external conflict is statistically insignificant.
These results hold for all five models. In particular, the coefficient of transnational terrorism is about -0. There is a potential endogeneity problem in our growth regressions with respect to openness and investment. We apply the IV method on a first-differenced growth model (e.g., Dollar and Kraay, 2003) , but the results are insignificant. As Dollar and Kraay (2003) demonstrated, this may be due to the identification problem. Unfortunately, finding good instruments is problematic, whereas weak instruments can lead to misleading conclusions (Dollar and Kraay, 2003) .
There are a number of potential reasons for why terrorism and other types of conflict influence a country's economy. One scenario is that terrorism and conflict crowd out growthpromoting investment for less productive government spending in terms of national security. We investigate this possibility by estimating investment and government spending models, given by equations (2)-(3). A positive impact of terrorism and conflict on government spending and a negative influence of terrorism and conflict on investment would be consistent with this crowding-in/crowding-out hypothesis. We perform specification tests for these two equations.
F-tests indicate that both time-specific and country-specific effects are significant for the investment models, whereas only country-specific effects are significant for Models 1-4 of government spending. 7 The Hausman test for the investment regression and the Wald statistic (an equivalent to the Hausman test) for the government spending regression indicate a correlation between the unobserved effects and the regressors for all models; thus, we employ two-way fixed-effects estimators for the investment models and one-way fixed-effects estimators for the government spending models.
[ Table 3 near here] Wacziarg (2001) . They, however, indicated that democracy has both positive (by improving property rights and contract enforcement, and by reducing uncertainties associated with political and socio-economic instability) and negative (by increasing the cost of labor) consequences on investment. Thus, the benefits from democracy appear, for our study, to outweigh the costs. Transnational terrorism is not statistically significant. External and internal conflicts are associated with a fall of the investment share of 0.73 and 0.66 percentage points, respectively. These results are weakly significant at the .10 level. External conflict is not significant when included with internal conflict (Model 4), while both external and internal conflicts become insignificant when the polity index is introduced (Model 5).
The insignificance of terrorism on investment must be interpreted with caution.
Empirical work found a large and statistically significant influence of terrorism on the less general measure of FDI (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008) . Because many investment projects cannot be easily reversed, they may be relatively insensitive to short-term shocks, captured by the fixed-effects estimator. Finally, the openness variable may be endogenous if a significant share of investment is directed toward trade-enhancing activities. In this case, the terrorism coefficient will be biased. We lag the openness variable to address partially this endogeneity. Even when we repeat the estimations either excluding openness or applying democracy as an instrument for openness, the effect of terrorism remains insignificant.
[ Table 4 near here]
For government spending models 8 in Table 4 , lagged income per capita decreases the percentage of government spending share, which may be attributable to automatic stabilizers.
That is, government spending contracts during good times when income per capita is high, while it expands during bad times when income per capita is low. Lagged openness, however, Although we find that political violence variables are negatively associated with growth and positively associated with government spending, we cannot compare the relative effect of these variables since the terrorism variable is measured in number of incidents per capita, while internal and external conflicts are indexed as dummy variables. To compare the relative magnitudes of the terrorism and conflict coefficients, we transform terrorism into an indicator variable and then reestimate Models 4 and 5 of the growth and the government spending regressions. Table 5 shows the results for the political violence variables. We do not present estimates of the investment regression, because the results are not robust across models. In Table 5 , the adverse impact of internal conflict on income per capita growth is over twice as large as that from transnational terrorism. Thus, internal conflict is a greater growth concern than transnational terrorism. Similarly, the impact of transnational terrorism on the share of government spending is about half of that of the external and internal conflict variables. Internal and external conflicts contribute almost equally to the need for government spending.
[ Table 5 near here]
Until now, we assumed that the influence of terrorism is the same across sample countries and periods; however, terrorism may have a stronger effect on countries with lessdeveloped economies. Advanced economies are more resilient and recover faster from shocks associated with terrorist incidents (Sandler and Enders, 2008) . To explore this possibility, we divide our sample into seven developed and thirty-five developing countries (see footnote 2) and repeat the analysis. For brevity, we focus on the coefficients of the political violence variables.
For developed countries, we exclude internal conflicts because there were almost no such conflicts.
As anticipated, the terrorism variable is never significant for developed countries in Table   6 . 10 External interstate conflicts reduce investment shares by just under 4 percent and increase government spending shares by about 1.2 percent. These results are highly significant and robust, except for Model 4 of the government spending regression, where external conflict is not significant. Development is no firewall against the adverse effects of interstate wars on investment and government spending.
20
[ Table 6 near here]
A different picture emerges for developing countries, which are adversely affected by conflicts and terrorism. 11 According to Table 7 , transnational terrorism has a statistically significant impact on growth and government spending, consistent with the entire sample.
Transnational terrorism's effect on growth is significant in Models 1, 5 and is insignificant when combined with conflict variables (Model 4) in the absence of the polity variable. External conflict is only significant in the government spending models. Finally, internal conflict is statistically significant in all relevant models. The sign of all significant coefficients are as
expected. An additional transnational terrorist incident per million persons results in a reduced growth of 1.4 percent and a rise in the government spending share of about 1.6 percent. The growth effect of terrorism increases to about 2 percent when the polity variable is introduced; but this change has more to do with the reduction in sample size. External conflicts lead to an increase in the government spending share of about 1.7 percent, which is similar to transnational terrorism. Internal conflict lowers growth and investment shares by about 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively, and raises the government spending share by approximately 1 percent.
[ Table 7 near here]
Finally, we examine the stability of the political violence parameters over time. As previously shown in Figure 2 -1970-1985 and 1986-2004 - and repeat our regressions. Table 4 . For 1986 For -2004 , terrorism and internal conflict slow down growth and raise government spending, while internal conflict reduces investment. The magnitude of the coefficients of terrorism and internal conflict variables in the growth and investment models are comparable to the corresponding pooled sample estimates in Table 2 and 4. The effect of internal conflict on investment is, however, larger and statistically stronger compared to the respective parameter in Table 3 . We do not find a statistically significant impact of external conflict in any model.
There is evidence that the economic impacts of the political violence variables, especially terrorism, become more resonant in the latter sample period. These results are preliminary; more formal analysis is needed to pinpoint the structural change. An investigation of the structural stability of the model may increase efficiency by imposing appropriate restrictions on coefficients. We hope that our results stimulate further investigation of this problem.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We added terrorism and conflict variables to a standard growth model to ascertain the influence that these political violence factors have on Asian growth for 1974-2004. Our one-year-panel analysis indicates that transnational terrorism has a significant short-run, growth-retarding effect for developing countries in Asia. Asian developed countries, however, manage to sustain terrorist attacks without displaying growth consequences. For Asian developing countries, transnational terrorism curbs income per capita growth primarily by stimulating government security spending, which diverts resources from more productive private and public investments.
Both internal and external conflicts are associated with smaller investment shares and larger government spending shares, with crowding-in of government expenditures dominating the crowding-out of investment. Internal conflicts have a much greater negative growth influence than transnational terrorist events or external conflicts. Populous countries must sustain a large increase in transnational terrorist attacks before displaying much lost in growth,
given that our terrorism measure is in terms of incidents per million persons. Both internal and external conflicts crowd in government spending of a similar magnitude that is about twice as large as that from transnational terrorism.
Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) , we must acknowledge several concerns that apply to all terrorism studies that use similar data. Terrorist event data are not the ideal measure of the unobservable perceived risk of terrorism, insofar as we cannot control for the magnitude or importance of individual events. Given that event data measure terrorist risk with error, our terrorism coefficients suffer from attenuation. The measurement error in explanatory variables is particularly problematic in fixed-effects models (Griliches and Hausman, 1986) . In addition, fixed-effects estimates of terrorism do not account for the long-run effects. Thus, our estimates are potentially conservative measures of terrorism's influence on growth.
A number of policy insights can be drawn from this analysis. Since transnational terrorism negatively impacts growth through increased government spending, targeted countries must ensure that they do not overspend on defensive and offensive counterterrorism measures.
Recent research indicates that there is a proclivity for at-risk countries to spend too much on protective countermeasures in the hopes of displacing potential attacks abroad (Enders and Sandler, 2006a; Siqueira and Sandler, 2006) . Such actions have a negative impact on growth, which makes it even more imperative that neighboring nations cooperate in their efforts to curb terrorism. Coordination failures may result in countries transferring attacks to their own people and property elsewhere in Asia, so that little security may be truly gained. This also means that Asian countries must take coordinated efforts to eliminate the terrorists and their weapons so that the need for defensive actions diminishes.
Because developing countries are less able than their more developed neighbors to withstand terrorist attacks without economic consequences, rich Asian countries must assist poorer neighbors to protect themselves and to recover from transnational terrorist attacks.
Moreover, the rich Asian nations must take a leadership role in proactive countermeasures against a common terrorist threat. Terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah which seeks a pan-Islamic state, underscore the need for coordinated government actions, because any Asian foothold that these terrorists achieve will allow them to pose greater risks throughout the region. There is another justification for Western nations to assist Asia to address its transnational terrorism. As Western countries augmented their homeland security following 9/11, there is a documented transference of attacks to the Middle East and Asia (Enders and Sandler, 2006b, pp. 388-391) . This transference means that Western countries have a responsibility for assisting. They also have a motive insofar as this transference involves an increase in attacks against Western persons and assets. Sandler is the Vibhooti Shukla Professor of Economics and Political Science.
1. In an earlier version of this paper, we also used a general measure for domestic and transnational terrorist attacks, taken from the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), compiled by the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD variable is generally insignificant, except for crowding out investment, and its removal had a negligible effect on the other coefficients; hence, we dropped these runs to conserve space.
The high variance of the GTD variable and the inability of START to recreate the counts of earlier years call into question the reliability of GTD, which was initially gathered by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services.
2. One reason for including the democracy variable is to avoid a possible omitted variable bias problem: democracy may influence growth and may also correlate with political violence variables. We also consider including fractionalization measures to account for a potential negative association between fractionalization and growth (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005 ) and a positive association between fractionalization and conflict variables. The only available fractionalization measures do not vary with time; thus, our fixed-effects estimator will wash out the influence of these time-invariant measures.
3. Orme and Yamagata (2006) 5. More specifically, we test the null hypotheses of no country-specific effects, no timespecific effects, no joint country-specific and time-specific effects, no country-specific effects conditional on the presence of time-specific effects, and no time-specific effects conditional on the presence of country-specific effects.
6. There are, however, disagreements in the literature on whether the negative initial income coefficient is a true measure of convergence or just a result of a Galtonian fallacy bias (see, e.g., Friedman, 1992; Hart, 1995; Quah, 1993) .
7. For Model 5, the time effects are significant, but the inclusion of time dummies in government spending regressions does not affect our conclusion on terrorism and conflict across all models.
8. 10. Investment models are estimated using the one-way (country) fixed effects, because time effects are not statistically significant. The qualitative results do not change if we include year-specific dummies. We also estimate growth and investment models using the randomeffects estimator, insofar as the Hausman test do not reveal an endogeneity problem. The results from Table 6 generally hold, except for external conflict which becomes marginally significant at the .10 level in the growth equation.
11. The growth and government spending models are estimated using one-way (country) fixed effects because the time effects are not statistically significant. Adding time dummies does not change the findings. For the government expenditure share models, we also estimate the models using the random-effects estimator -the results are virtually identical to those in Table 7 . 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 External conflict Internal conflict 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Incidents per million persons Notes: Hausman test is between two-way fixed effects and two-way random effects. df denotes the degree of freedom and p-value is the probability value. Constant, time, and country dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** is .01, ** is .05, and * is .10. The Wald statistic is asymptotically equivalent to the Hausman test between fixed effects and random effects. The Hausman test is not presented because the matrix of the difference between variances of the fixed-effects estimates and the random-effects estimates is not positive definite. df denotes the degree of freedom and p-value is the probability value. Constant, and country dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** is .01, ** is .05, and * is .10. Table 2 and Models 4, 5 of Table 4 for specification. terror is a dummy variable for transnational terrorism. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** is .01, ** is .05, and * is .10. Tables 2-4 for specification. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** is .01, ** is .05, and * is .10.
